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HOW DO YOU DISCIPLINE A PROFESSION

By Wallace E. Olson
For Arthur Young Professors’ Roundtable
April 6-7, 1978

DISCIPLINE OF PROFESSIONS - GENERAL CONCEPTS
One of the hallmarks of a profession is an accreditation

or licensing process before being permitted to practice or hold

one’s self out as being a member of the group.

Generally, either

state or federal governments establish right to practice

requirements to assure consumers that licensees have met minimum
standards.

In this sense, accreditation requirements are intended

to be preventative rather than punitive.

The notion that there should be an effective system for
continuing regulation and disciplining of a profession is a
natural adjunct to the monopoly that is granted to a qualified

group under the law.

It is rooted in the belief that initial

qualification requirements are not sufficient, standing alone, to

protect the consuming public from malpractice.

The threat of

punishment for wrong-doing by licensees is perceived to be an

essential part of the total scheme for public protection.
It is interesting to note that the sanctions provided
under the licensing laws are normally restricted to suspensions

or revocations of rights to practice.
injunctive in nature.

Thus the sanctions are

Redress for civil damages or punishment for
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criminal acts relating to malpractice must be sought under the

civil liability and criminal laws that are designed for application
to a much wider range of activities than that of professionals.

Given this combination of regulation by threats of

revocation of rights to practice, civil damages and criminal

penalties one might wonder why an organized profession either
desires or is expected to impose on itself additional forms of

discipline or sanctions.

One answer might be that professions

have membership organizations in the private sector designed to
enhance the quality of practice of its members as well as the

stature of the profession in the eyes of the public.

A code of

ethics is seen to be an important means of achieving these

objectives and some form of disciplining mechanism is necessary
to give meaning and teeth to the code.
Another answer might be that a profession generally

desires to keep governmental intervention in its affairs at a
minimum.

An effective system of self-regulation is believed to

be the best way to achieve this objective although it is by no
means a guarantee that a profession will be left to handle its

affairs solely by itself.

It is probably true that a private group generally does

not impose disciplinary sanctions on its members wholly out of
altruistic motives.

It does so in part because the members

believe the alternative of greater governmental involvement is
likely to be more onerous.

If one accepts this premise, it follows
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that, to be effective, a system of self-regulation must be
accompanied by a serious and continuing threat of additional

forms of outside regulation.

Indeed it has often been observed

somewhat cynically that the phrase "self-regulation” is a
contradiction of terms in that substantive regulation and

sanctions are seldom self-imposed by a private group.
Those who are inclined to ascribe a much higher level

of altruism to the motives of professionals have long insisted
that the essence of professionalism is to put the public's

interest ahead of self-interest.

A dedication to serving others

is regarded as essential to laying claim to being a professional
and a profession has an obligation to be concerned about

substandard behavior whether or not it is actionable under
the law.

Even if one subscribes to this optimistic view of
human behavior it is generally believed that a disciplinary

system is necessary to assure that practitioners adhere to the
high ideals of a professional.

This raises the question whether

a practitioner who behaves mainly out of fear of discipline is

really a professional.

Put another way, if a profession is

composed of professionals capable of individual self-restraint
why is a disciplinary system necessary?

Perhaps the answer is that the behavior of professionals

is not a great deal different than that of the rest of the
population.

An essential ingredient in improving the behavior of
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professionals, like that of all human behavior, is the threat of

punishment for wrong doing.
Even the threat of punishment has been of questionable

effectiveness in curbing the misdeeds of individuals who lack
respect for authority and the law.

It has often been argued that

morality and good behavior cannot be legislated.

Nevertheless

few would urge that all attempts at moral restraint should be

dropped.

Most people are likely to behave better as a result of

the threat of punishment for wrongdoing.

Thus, "How do you

discipline a profession" is really a question of what kinds of
punishment and how great a threat of punishment of members of a
profession is necessary to assure that expected levels of

performance will be met.

This is a complex matter because it involves an
evaluation of the strength of pressure that might cause a
break-down in performance as well as identifying levels of

performance that can reasonably be expected to be attained by

the average practitioner.

These involve highly subjective

judgments which make decisions about individual cases or the

effectiveness of a disciplinary system difficult at best..

THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

It would be interesting to know what would happen if
the public accounting profession were to abandon all efforts to
discipline itself.

Would the quality of performance decline
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dramatically from the present levels?

audit failures increase?

Would the number of alleged

Would the states or the federal

government rush in with legislation to establish an additional
disciplinary system that would provide for sanctions such as

monetary fines which would go beyond the present suspensions or
revocations of rights to practice?

The answers to these questions are not clear but it is
probably safe to assume that the elimination of all self-

disciplinary efforts would be unacceptable to the profession
/
and the public alike even though such efforts may not be wholly
successful.

Accordingly, starting with the assumption that a

system of self-discipline is generally believed to be necessary,
and that the combined internal and external disciplinary systems

ought to be made as effective as possible in protecting the
public from malpractice, it is appropriate to address these
questions:

1.

Who should be disciplined?

2.

What types of misconduct should give rise

to discipline?
3.

What types of sanctions should be imposed?

4.

Which institutions should impose discipline

and how much?
The balance of this paper is devoted to a discussion

of these questions.
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WHO SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED?
Since the state accountancy statutes are all designed

to regulate the accreditation and practice of CPAs as individuals

the provisions for suspension or revocation of a CPA certificate
applies only to individuals.

It is true that in a few states

CPA firms must also register to practice.

For all practical

purposes, however, the disciplinary machinery of state boards of
accountancy are directed at individuals.
Most practice is carried on today in the names of firms

rather than in that of individual practitioners.

CPAs have

increasingly surrendered their individual identities to firm
entities which sign auditor’s reports, set policies and carry

on multi-location practices on a partnership of professional

corporation basis.

If a substandard performance occurs it

raises questions about who was at fault.
firm’s policies?

Was it a defect in the

If not, did an individual in the firm fail to

adhere to its policies?

If the firm's policies were deficient

should top management be disciplined as the responsible individuals
or should a sanction be imposed on the entire firm, or both?

In recent times there has been growing recognition
that the way practice is conducted calls for a means of
disciplining firms as well as individuals.

In the past the only

attempts of regulators to deal with firms have been those of
the SEC under Rule 2e proceedings and injunctive actions.

When

a very large CPA firm was involved the SEC found it impractical
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to suspend it from practice before the Commission because of the
harm such action would impose on the firm's innocent SEC clients.

Therefore, alternative sanctions have been developed such as
suspensions of single offices of firms, mandated peer reviews

and agreements not to add new SEC clients for specified periods.

Of course SEC injunctive actions against firms have also
invariably spawned civil liability suits which have proved to
be an additional and more severe and effective form of discipline
of firms.
The disciplinary machinery of the AICPA and the state

societies has confined itself in the past to bringing actions

only against individuals.

Since firms have not been members of

the profession's organizations there has been no basis upon which

they could be disciplined as entities.

The AICPA has now established a division for firms
with two sections, one for SEC practice and another for private

companies practice.

Each section can impose sanctions on its

firm members for not meeting the requirements for participation.

This is a significant step since it brings firms within a selfdisciplinary scheme for the first time.

It represents a

voluntary surrender of a considerable degree of autonomy on the

part of those firms who become participants in the division.
Implied in this development is the acceptance that an
effective system of discipline for the public accounting profession

must be able to deal with both individual CPAs and CPA firms as

-8-

separate entities depending upon the cause of the substandard
performance giving rise to a need for disciplinary action.
Thus the answer to the question “Who should be disciplined"

seems to be individuals, firms or both, depending upon the

circumstances.
WHAT TYPES OF MISCONDUCT SHOULD GIVE RISE TO DISCIPLINE?

At first blush it might appear to be a simple matter to

determine what types of misconduct should give rise to discipline.
Most people feel that they know misconduct when they see it.
But when it comes to evaluating the performance of practicing

CPAs there are many degrees of misconduct that make disciplinary

decisions very difficult.

Indeed, in deciding circumstances

when auditors should be held liable even the courts have had

great difficulty in defining where the dividing lines should
be drawn.

Probably everyone would agree that a conscious
violation of the profession’s technical standards or a knowing

participation in the issuance of misleading audited financial
statements call for a disciplinary action.

Less clear is whether

an honest oversight or mistake by an auditor should result in

a sanction.

Even if it should not, is there a point of such

gross negligence or recklessness that a sanction should be
imposed and where should the line be drawn?

Also, to what

extent should it be required that harm resulted before the

disciplinary process comes into play?
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In most cases involving questionable technical
performance a further complication is the difficulty in

determining the technical standard to which the practitioner

should be held.

For example, when a management fraud has not

been detected by an auditor it is seldom clear whether a
normally prudent auditor exercising due care would have

uncovered the fraud.

Often the technical standards are not sufficiently
defined to be able to measure performance.

For instance, the

responsibilities of auditors associated with unaudited financial
statements have yet to be fully determined.

The Continental

Vending case is an example of a specific case where the existence
of an appropriate standard to apply was unclear.
Tribunals faced with making decisions about the

adequacy of technical performance, whether it be the courts,
the SEC, state boards of accountancy or the profession's trial
boards, find themselves more often than not making subjective

judgments about what the defendent auditors should have done
under the circumstances.

Such judgments are always made with

the benefit of hindsight when it is known that a mistake was made
and what caused it.

It would take a body of saints to prevent

such knowledge from causing a bias in the judgment about what the
auditors should have done at the time when the present

information was not known.
Under these circumstances it seems clear that the
standards for determining misconduct are, to a large extent,
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established ad hoc by subjective judgments made with the benefit

of hindsight.

Broad concepts such as negligence, recklessness

and scienter may be followed but applying them to a specific set

of facts is largely a subjective process.

Thus the public

accounting profession is in a position of having to accept as a
risk of doing business the fact that it will be held responsible

for meeting a shifting set of standards subjectively determined

by hindsight and usually by an uninformed laity if litigation
is involved.

This is not to say that the standards of the

profession are useless or ignored for disciplinary purposes.

But compliance with them is no guarantee that in a particular
set of circumstances an auditor will be held blameless.

There

is simply no substitute for vigilance and good judgment when it •
comes to avoiding blame.
In addition to requiring adherence to technical
standards the state boards of accountancy and the profession's

state and national organizations have included a series of rules

on general behavior in their codes of conduct.

These rules

have as their principal objective fostering harmony and courtesy

within the profession, ostensibly to assure that the public is
well served.
Because many of the rules place a degree of restraint
on unfettered competition it has been charged in recent times

that they may be in violation of the antitrust laws.

Rules

restricting advertising and solicitation are now seen to be
improper restraints on competition unless they involve false
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claims or deception.

Other rules relating to contingent fees,

encroachment, incompatible occupations and offers of employment

to employees of other CPA firms are likely to be subject to
the same kind of attack.

Perhaps the only behavioral rules likely to survive
the test of current perceptions about what serves the public
interest are those that deal with potential conflicts of interest

or rights to privacy.

These include the rules on independence,

receipt or payment of commissions and confidentiality of client
information.

The foregoing observations lead to the conclusion

that the profession and the state boards of accountancy are

likely to be restricted to imposing discipline for the following
types of offenses:

1.

Performing services without competence or due
care or failing to adhere to technical standards.

2.

Knowingly engaging in deceptive practices or
misrepresenting facts in the practice of public
accounting.

3.

Failing to adhere to rules on independence and
commissions when reporting on audits of financial

statements as an independent auditor.
4.

Being found guilty of a felony for acts whether

or not related to the practice of public accounting.
5.

Violating the confidences of clients except as
technical standards, the law, peer reviews or
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disciplinary proceedings require such disclosure.
6.

Any unspecified acts, whether or not related to

the practice of public accounting, that bring
discredit on the entire profession.

Only the first three of these offenses are a basis for
disciplinary sanctions by the SEC, although presumably an auditor

might be found to be unfit and suspended from practice under

the fourth or sixth categories.

The first three offenses are

also recognized by the courts as providing a basis for either
civil liability or criminal penalties depending upon a showing

of willfulness or deliberate intent to engage in a fraud or
conduct so reckless as to be its equivalent.
As previously noted it is one thing to describe in

a general way what types of misconduct should give rise' to
discipline but it is quite another to make judgments about

whether in a specific case misconduct that should result in
discipline has occurred.

Nevertheless the profession, the courts

and governmental regulatory bodies should and must do the best
they can to impose punishment fairly for offenses under these

broad categories, however imprecise they may be.

WHAT TYPES OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED?

The range of sanctions that have been imposed against
members or firms of the profession include:
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1.

Private or public censure by the profession’s
organizations.

2.

Remedial actions including peer reviews and

attendance at specified educational courses.

3.

Suspension or expulsion from membership in the

profession’s organizations.
4.

Injunctions against continuing violations of
the federal securities laws.

5.

Suspension or revocation of a CPA’s certificate

and right to practice.
6.

Money damages in civil liability suits.

7.

Fines and/or imprisonment for criminal acts..

Until recently, when the AICPA’s division for firms

was established, the sanctions that could be imposed by the

profession’s disciplinary actions were the least effective of

those of the various disciplining bodies.

Members, who are

expelled from the profession’s organizations may still be able
to practice if their licenses are not revoked.

This is not to

say that the profession’s sanctions have been wholly ineffective.
Practitioners have consistently taken the profession’s disciplinary

actions against them very seriously because of the damage it can

do to their reputations and their ability to recruit and hold a
qualified staff.

Also the profession’s sanctions are brought to

the attention of state boards of accountancy which can result in
a suspension or revocation of a CPA’s license to practice.
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The AICPA's new division for firms has adopted a range

of sanctions that includes the possible imposition of fines for
failure to maintain appropriate quality controls.

This goes

beyond the traditional types of punishment that the profession
has imposed in the past.

Even the SEC and the state boards of

accountancy do not have the authority to impose fines on CPAs

or CPA firms.

The most severe penalties are those that can be imposed
by the licensing bodies and the courts.

Revocation of rights

to practice and fines or imprisonment are the most extreme

measures that can be taken.

Only slightly less severe are the

money damages resulting from civil liability suits.

Even though

there are widely varying judgments about when and to whom

auditors should be held liable for money damages, this form of
sanction has had the single greatest effect on the profession's

performance.

The threat of unlimited liability has caused most

practitioners to take the quality of their work very seriously.
Based upon experience to date it seems clear that each
of the seven types of sanctions listed above are necessary to

provide gradations of penalties to fit the differing degrees of

- professional misconduct that may be encountered in. practice.

The principal problem is not identifying types of sanctions to

impose.

The greatest difficulty is determining how to apply, on

a consistent basis, the range of sanctions to the varying degrees

of misconduct.
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WHICH INSTITUTIONS SHOULD IMPOSE DISCIPLINE AND HOW MUCH?
A major question which is yet to be resolved is whether

the present forms of discipline of the public accounting profession
are sufficient to assure the levels of performance that can
reasonably be expected, given the nature of the functions involved.

The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities addressed this
question and concluded:

"The total system as it now exists, including
litigation and actions by regulatory bodies,
provides a reasonable level of protection to
the public.

Nevertheless improvements in the

system are warranted and should be implemented."

At the hearings of the House Subcommittee on Oversight

and Investigations chaired by Congressman Moss on January 31
through February 2, 1978, contrary views were expressed.

Clearly

the SEC and members of Congress believed that a more stringent
system of regulation of CPA firms practicing before the SEC is
necessary within either the AICPA or a quasi-governmental body

under the oversight of the SEC.

It can be argued that the threat of unlimited legal
liability is sufficient, standing alone, to assure that the

profession will take all reasonable steps to avoid audit failures.

A number of practitioners have questioned whether it makes sense

for the profession to add its own layer of discipline on top

of legal liability, SEC sanctions and the possible suspension by
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state boards of accountancy.

Although this addition may not be

necessary from the standpoint of needed restraining pressures it

is likely, as previously noted, that neither the profession nor

the public is prepared to accept a complete abdication of

disciplinary responsibility by the profession.

To the contrary,

there are strong pressures to increase the amount of self
regulation and make it more effective.

Presumably this is based

upon the view that the profession has an obligation to protect

the public through preventative measures thereby minimizing the
need for resorting to the courts for redress.
Some have expressed the view that the amount of legal

liability of auditors should be limited because the threat of
unlimited liability causes excessive defensiveness on the part
of the profession.

New responsibilities are shunned out of

fear of increased exposure to lawsuits.
No doubt a better balance could be struck but it

seems unlikely that any relief will be granted by a Congress
that is demanding greater regulation of the profession.

Even

if a limitation of liability were granted it would almost
certainly be accompanied by a quid-pro-quo of some new form of

federal regulation.

The profession would be unlikely to find

such a trade-off acceptable.
It seems certain that all the present institutions
involved in disciplining the profession will continue to function
for the foreseeable future.

The question is not whether any
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will be eliminated but how they will be made more effective and
what additional forms and layers of discipline will be added.

If

the AICPA-sponsored Division for CPA Firms is successful

in its efforts to regulate and impose sanctions on firms perhaps
the SEC and Congress will be persuaded that additional federal

regulation is unnecessary.

If not, the establishment of a NASD

type regulatory body under the direct oversight of the SEC
becomes likely.

A key problem that must be resolved if more governmental
regulation is to be avoided is finding a way to take disciplinary

action immediately even though litigation is involved in an
alleged case of substandard audit performance.

Because the AICPA

does not have subpoena powers it has found litigation to be an

insurmountable barrier to prompt action.

It cannot compel

production of witnesses or evidence, and its files are open to
discovery by adverse parties in litigation.

Most CPA firms take the position that the profession
should not attempt to preempt the judicial system and thereby
jeopardize the due process rights of the individuals involved.

On the other hand the SEC, members of Congress and other critics

of the profession’s disciplinary efforts find its policy of
deferring action pending a determination through litigation to

be wholly unacceptable.
From the standpoint of pressures needed to cause CPA

firms to exercise every reasonable precaution against malpractice,
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it would seem that where litigation is involved this need is

met by the threat of substantial money damages.
additional discipline should not be necessary.

Immediate

Unfortunately

a great deal of today's criticism is based upon appearances
and the critics are not always persuaded by the substance.

To solve the litigation problem and avoid a new federal
regulatory body somebody will have to give ground.

Either the

SEC and members of Congress will have to be persuaded by the
merits of the profession's position or the CPA firms will have

to voluntarily comply with immediate disciplinary proceedings
under whatever protection can be secured to prevent unfair

influence on pending litigation.
This issue may have to be addressed and resolved by

the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of Firms
at an early stage of its activities.

Thus the die is likely to

be cast within the next few months that will determine whether
the SEC will continue to support the profession's new selfregulatory system for firms in lieu of new regulatory legislation.
The institution that has received the least attention

is the state board of accountancy.

Historically the state

boards, with few exceptions, have been woefully ineffective in

meeting their disciplinary responsibilities.

This stems in part

from a lack of funds and investigative staff.

Because the boards can suspend or revoke the right to
practice they offer a fertile possibility for increasing the
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disciplinary pressures on the profession.

Perhaps the profession

should turn its attention to improving the capabilities of the

boards as a means of satisfying the critics.

It is questionable,

however, whether this would appease members of Congress who have
a natural inclination to solve the perceived problems at the
federal level through its creation, the SEC.

In any event, the

firms might find effective and immediate state regulation to be
almost as distasteful as federal regulation and would, no doubt,

opt for self-regulation rather than pursue a course of
strengthening the state boards.

Otherwise, there would be the

likely result of incurring additional sanctions at both levels

of government.
To sum up, the outlook is for more disciplinary
machinery, not less.

The question of whether a new federal

regulatory scheme will be established through legislation hangs

in the balance pending an appraisal of the effectiveness of the

AICPA Division for Firms.
Whether the many layers of disciplinary pressures are
all necessary is open to question but in the present environment
any argument for reduction is likely to fall on deaf ears.

Suggestions for relief from unlimited legal liability are likely
to receive the same reception.

Under present circumstances practitioners and firms
are well advised to pay great attention to maintaining the

highest possible quality controls.

If they wish to avoid
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sanctions that can flow from as many as five different sources

for the same offense they will take increasingly defensive
positions in resolving problems with their clients.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The present system for disciplining the public

accounting profession is scattered among a number of institutions,
some governmental, some in the private sector and, perhaps

most important, the judicial system.

While there are some

limited interrelationships between these institutions, significant

portions of the overall disciplinary scheme function wholly

independent of the others.

As a result, there are multiple

layers of punishment for the same offense and the severity of

the sanctions imposed can vary widely depending upon the
disciplining body.
Because in recent years the profession's performance

has been judged by its critics to be unsatisfactory there have
been demands for additional and more effective discipline.

The

assumption is made that more aggressive punishment will bring

about a significant improvement in the effectiveness of audits.
No doubt there were instances of audit failures in

the late 1960's and early 1970's, but not all of the business

failures during this period were attributable to poor auditing
performance by the profession.

Some were the result of well-

executed management fraud and others occurred simply because
bad management decisions led to bankruptcy.

Others occurred
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because the profession was too inclined to permit accounting
treatments that conformed to generally accepted accounting
principles even though the circumstances called for different

treatments to make financial statements not misleading.
A rapid increase in the number of lawsuits against

accounting firms occurred during this period.

The firms may

have been slow to recognize the significance of this development

in the early stages but there is little doubt that today they

are expending great effort toward preventative measures.

Also

the firms have become far less prone to bend to management

pressures and the emergence of stronger client audit committees
has significantly strengthened the independent position of

auditors.
To the extent that such preventative measures have
already been taken due to pressures under the existing system of
discipline it is at least debatable whether additional layers of
discipline will yield any significant degree of improvement in

performance.

The penalties for malpractice are already so

severe that few firms are likely to be careless about the quality

of their work.
Nevertheless there is generally a considerable lag

in time between the occurrence of poor performance by a profession
and the point at which public concern becomes sufficiently
aroused to take corrective action.

Seldom, if ever, is the

barn door locked before the horse is stolen.

When action is

taken, however, it tends to go further than necessary and

-22-

sometimes ignores the fact that the identified problem has
already been resolved during the interim by the actions of

existing institutions.

There is little reason to believe that the public

accounting profession's experience will vary from this pattern.
Indeed, it is already virtually a certainty that a new layer
of discipline will be imposed either through the AICPA-sponsored

Division for CPA Firms, the SEC or a newly legislated regulatory
body.

It is also possible that some combination of these

alternatives will evolve.

The eventual outcome depends to a substantial degree
on how far the profession elects to go in imposing on itself or

its clients a number of perceived cures for past failures in
corporate accountability.

1.

Principal among these are:

Required independent audit committees for
audit clients.

2.

Reports to the public on deficiencies in the
systems of internal control of audit clients.

3.

Restrictions on the scope of consulting services

provided to audit clients.
The SEC is aggressively pressing the profession to
act on each of these matters.

If the profession falls short

of expectations in its response there is the clear implication
that the SEC will take action on its own through rulemaking or

by seeking legislation if additional authority is required.
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In addition to these immediate challenges the
profession continues to be faced with the crucial problem of

what to do with respect to disciplinary proceedings when

litigation is involved.
The proposed actions on all of these matters are the
subject of substantial controversy within the profession and it
remains to be seen how far the profession will go toward

accommodating the wishes of the SEC and critics in Congress.

Whatever happens, the tide of sentiment for reforms in corporate
accountability and the effectiveness of auditors is running so

strong that additional governmental regulation of the profession
will be difficult to avoid.

In the end, it may make little difference whether

existing forms of discipline are adequate to provide as much
public protection from malpractice as is reasonably attainable.
When extensive wrong-doing occurs in the business community,

such as the recent revelations about illegal political

contributions, bribes and off-book slush funds, new forms of

regulation will be devised and superimposed on existing systems

of discipline.

When dramatic business failures occur unheralded

in the future, additional steps are likely to be taken to place
even further corrective pressure on the auditing profession.

This search for total assurance against error is likely to

continue even though the goal is clearly unattainable.
In the past, the belief that governmental intervention

will solve most of our country’s problems has led to a huge
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bureaucracy that touches nearly every facet of our lives.

Lately, however, there is a growing recognition that this belief
is not entirely warranted by our experience with big government.

Even so, it will be a major achievement if the profession's
actions toward self-regulation prove to be successful in

convincing its critics that additional governmental regulation

is unnecessary.

Self-regulation is a worthy objective but it requires

being able to transcend the norms of human behavior as well as

having the will to take timely action to satisfy the aroused
concerns of legislators.

Whether the public accounting profession

will clear both of these formidable hurdles is an open question

which is likely to be answered in the very near future.

It is

to be fervently hoped that the profession will meet the test and

strike a small blow for preserving free enterprise in our society.

